OPTIMIZATION OF VEHICLE THEFT PROTECTION CONSIDERING CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.28925/2663-4023.2026.35.1419

Keywords:

vehicle theft protection; mechanical measures; electronic measures; passive keyless entry; authentication; relay attack; timeout.

Abstract

The study aims to substantiate the selection of a reduced factory timeout for passive keyless authentication within coordinated mechanical and electronic vehicle theft protection. The methods include analysis of scientific and regulatory sources, interval modelling of timing characteristics, analytical derivation of threshold feasibility conditions, and functional comparison of protective measures. Mechanical barriers to electronic control units and wiring, diagnostic port protection, independent start authorisation, and seven approaches to countering relay attacks are considered. The main theoretical result is a threshold selection model based on guaranteed bounds of complete legitimate and relayed exchanges, measurement errors, and the timeout adjustment step. For a continuous threshold, feasibility requires a positive separation interval. For a discrete threshold, an exact condition for the existence of an admissible setting is derived. A threshold that maximises the smaller clearance from the two timing boundaries is justified. Dimensionless illustrative calculations show that a positive separation interval may contain no admissible setting when the adjustment step is too large. Under the additional assumption of additive relay delay, a sufficient condition is derived from its lower bound and the legitimate response time range. Experimental findings reported by Francillon and colleagues explain the relationship between timing quantities; they are neither original measurements of this study nor universal vehicle parameters. The established principle of timing-based proximity verification is not claimed as a new protocol. The practical value is a procedure for assessing timeout feasibility and coordinating this decision with physical barriers, digital command verification, diagnostic access control and secure updates. Relevant provisions of UN Regulations Nos. 155 and 156 are mapped to protective functions. The study is theoretical and analytical, reports no original experiments, and does not claim a quantified reduction in vehicle theft probability. Model assumptions and application limits are specified. System-specific timing bounds and protocol behaviour require validation before deployment; the model alone cannot establish protection against every relay implementation.

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References

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Published

2026-10-26

How to Cite

Svitlychnyi, V. (2026). OPTIMIZATION OF VEHICLE THEFT PROTECTION CONSIDERING CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS. Electronic Professional Scientific Journal «Cybersecurity: Education, Science, Technique», 3(35), 401–415. https://doi.org/10.28925/2663-4023.2026.35.1419